Meanwhile, the simplified acquisition threshold increased Government-wide from $150,000 (which has been inflation adjusted) to $250,000. For contingencies, emergencies, and major disasters, the limit is now $750,000 (domestic) and $1.5 million (for work outside the U.S.), with a $500,000 threshold for humanitarian and peace-keeping procurements outside the U.S. The government has yet to take full advantage of this increase, and agencies and contractors would do well to push for reliance on this flexibility.
Experience suggests there will be problems, but they'll also largely occur below the radar screen. Arguably, that's the whole point: out of sight, out of mind. From a policy perspective, Congress is betting, and we tend to agree, that reduced transactions costs for massive numbers of transactions will more than offset any losses, higher prices, fraud, and abuse facilitated by the streamlined approach and reduced oversight associated with micropurchases and simplified acquisitions. By analogy, see, e.g., GSA Travel Card Program Needs Better Oversight, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 301 (IG found that, although cardholders were using their travel cards inappropriately, supervisors did not receive the questionable charges reports in a timely manner, and cardholders continued to make inappropriate charges undetected); Developments In Brief(a) : DOD IG Finds Incomplete Purchase Card Reports to OMB, 60 GC ¶ 126, DODIG-2018 -101, DoD Reporting of Charge Card Misuse to OMB, available at media.defense.gov/2018 /Apr/09/2001900779/-1/-1/1/ DODIG-2018 .PDF. See also, CIGIE Finds High-Risk Transactions Using Purchase Cards, 60 GC ¶ 216 (Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) randomly sampled 1,255 of 1.8 million transactions totaling over $941 million from 2016-2017, and found that 40 percent did not Two years into the current administration, and we're still not fully accustomed to the vacancy and turnover rates in high level (e.g., up to, and including, cabinet level), politically-appointed leadership. And nothing suggests that 2019 will bring a wave of nominations to fill critical positions with highly qualified individuals committed to serving in specific capacities for lengthy periods of time.
Still Waiting at oFPP. We would be remiss if we did not take this (now annual) opportunity to remind readers that the current Administration has not nominated a candidate to serve as Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). Given the number of vacancies and acting appointments generally -and, most obviously, at high(er) levels, such as Cabinet-level positions -we are no longer holding our breath. Given the longstanding, demonstrated competence of the career staff to operate without political leadership, we hesitate to elevate this to crisis level, but we consider it disappointing and consider it a squandered opportunity. Among other things, because the OFPP Administrator is a leading face and voice for the profession, the vacancy does not bode well the perception of procurement process and the morale of the acquisition community.
Nor do we expect much focused leadership on procurement from elsewhere, such as the higher levels within the office of Management and Budget (oMB), where leadership is on the move and wearing multiple hats. OMB Director Mick Mulvaney already was spending half his time simultaneously running the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the OMB's deputy director, Margaret Weichert, was tapped to also run the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Then, in December, the President announced that Mulvaney would serve as acting White House chief of staff. Russell T. Vought was quickly elevated to acting OMB director, though an official announcement has not yet been made. Maybe the partial shutdown will offer OMB acting director Vought an opportunity to settle in his new role. Contrast this with what appears to be vigorous and knowledgeable procurement leadership elsewhere in government, including GSA, where Emily Murphy has taken significant steps (see the discussion of schedule consolidation, above).
Changing of the Guard at DoD:
We assume we were not alone in failing to anticipate that the resignation of Secretary of Defense James Mattis would make way for Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan to serve as -for now -Acting Secretary of Defense. (Of course, this is not unprecedented; the last time the deputy secretary served a lengthy period was 1989, when William Howard Taft IV held the position for two months.) Meanwhile, at DPAC/DPAP, Shay Assad is returning to his position as Director for Pricing and Contracting Initiatives, and Kim Herrington is currently serving as the Acting Principal Director for Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC). In a bizarre and unrelated twist, earlier in the year, on August 21, DPAP alerted the public of a potential scam, that an individual may be impersonating Shay Assad by email and/or telephone in an attempt to obtain software/equipment/ etc. Truth is stranger than fiction. 13-5 and Daniel Ramish, Feature Comment: Section 809 And 'e-Portal' Proposals, By Cutting Bid Protests In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption, 60 GC ¶ 138; CRS Surveys Bid Protest Forum Distinctions, 60 GC ¶ 299; David H. Carpenter & Moshe Schwartz, Government Contract Bid Protests: Analysis of Legal Processes and Recent Developments (R45080, November 28, 2018 ) ("Congress might utilize the information gained from … studies, reports, and pilot programs to inform its consideration of substantive legislative reforms to the bid protest system[, … including] implementation of certain recommendations in the RAND report or making permanent, expanding, or eliminating the pilot program that requires certain contractors to reimburse the government for the costs associated with adjudicating unsuccessful protests."), available at crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45080.
V. DeFenSe ACQUiSiTion
Among other things, we're curious to see if and how the 809 Panel report addresses the concern that, increasingly, the FAR and DoD's Procedures, Guidance, and information (PGi) don't accurately reflect practice in the field. For example, in a recent report, GAO explained that orders under indefinite-delivery contracts comprised roughly 40 percent of DoD obligations in fiscal years 2015 through 2017. In that context, we find it remarkable how inadequately the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) describes the process through which 40 percent of DoD's acquisition spending flows. For example, GAO notes that, despite FAR 16.500(a)'s established preference for multiple awards, " [o] f the DOD awards for the indefinite-delivery /indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract type during this period, about three-quarters were made to a single contractor, rather than multiple contractors." Indeed, Table 1 -2018 -0005, 83 Fed. Reg. 5762 (February 9, 2018 . DoD is proposing to define PALT as "the time between the date on which the initial solicitation for a contract or task order of the Department of Defense is issued and the date of the award of the contract or task order." DoD plans to use Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to measure and publicly disseminate PALT data. In a March 12, 2018 letter, the Council on Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) supported harmonizing the definition of, and then tracking, PALT. CODSIA also suggested "that buying activities should have the flexibility to track PALT at an earlier stage[, which would …] not only aid buying activities in managing their acquisitions, [but also] … provide greater opportunities for the Department to reduce the time spent on such acquisitions. ... [Particularly] for complex information technology or other services acquisitions, or major systems purchases, the time between a requirements determination and solicitation may be the longer period in the acquisition lifecycle. Not only is this worth capturing and reporting, it should be a principal focus of reduction efforts." Letter available at DARS-2018 DARS- -0005 http://www.codsia.org/uploads/6/8/9/9/68991301/ codsia_comments_dars-2018 e. Transparency: every Little Bit Helps. We're also pleased to hear that USD(A&S) Lord intends to promote transparency by restricting use of "For Official Use Only" designations on various acquisition reports. (This would be a breath of fresh air amidst an administration that has consistently moved in the wrong direction on transparency.) See https://www.executivegov.
com/2019/01/ellen-lord-sets-plan-to-promote-pentagon-wide-acquisitiontransparency/.
F. The end of the LPTA era? We applaud Congressional and DoD cognizance of, focus on, and commitment to, ending the scourge of over-reliance on, and misuse of, lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) competitions. The wheels on this are moving slowly, but, apparently, they're still moving. Comments on DOD's proposed rule, available at 83 Fed. Reg. 62550 (December 4, 2018) , are due in early February. As late as November, GAO bemoaned that the FY17 NDAA, Section 813, "mandated that DOD revise its regulations to require that eight criteria be considered when using the LPTA process. As of September 2018, DOD had not yet done so." The eight criteria (including the two added in the FY18 NDAA) that that DOD contracting officers must ensure before issuing a solicitation on an LPTA basis are:
• DOD can clearly describe the minimum requirements in terms of performance objectives, measures, and standards that will be used to determine acceptability of offers.
• DOD would realize no, or little, value from a proposal exceeding the solicitation's minimum technical requirements.
• The proposed technical approaches can be evaluated with little or no subjectivity as to the desirability of one versus the other.
• There is a high degree of certainty that a review of technical proposals other than that of the lowest-price offeror would not identify factors that could provide other benefits to the government.
• The contracting officer has included a justification for the use of the LPTA process in the contract file.
• The lowest price reflects full life-cycle costs, including for operations and support. (We're ecstatic to see life-cycling costing gain increased visibility.)
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• DOD would realize little or no additional innovation or future technological advantage by using a different methodology.
• For the acquisition of goods, the goods being purchased are predominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short life expectancy or shelf life.
GAO also recommended that the DFARS should clarify how officials should apply the criteria that goods be expendable, nontechnical or short-lived, and that the lowest price reflects full life-cycle costs. "Absent additional direction, contracting officials across DOD may not understand how to consistently apply these criteria when using the LPTA process," GAO cautioned.
See The OT authorities were created to give DoD the flexibility necessary to adopt and incorporate business practices that reflect commercial industry standards and best practices into its award instruments. When leveraged appropriately, OTs provide the Government with access to state-of-the-art technology solutions from traditional and Non-Traditional Defense Contractors, through a multitude of potential teaming arrangements tailored to the particular project and the needs of the participants.
We appreciate the fact that the guide was "intended for two primary audiences, both the 
• Collaborate in innovative arrangements
After a brief overview, the guide proceeds in three parts: (1) Planning; (2) Publicizing, Soliciting, and Evaluating (concluding, basically, with award); and (3) Administration (or what we might call post-award contract, agreement, or relationship management). Weighing in at approximately 125 pages (in the PDF version), the online resource is informative and exhaustive, yet surprisingly accessible, containing, among other things, case studies, a glossary, and a chronological history of statutory authority. Notably missing from this list (and the guide itself) is the absence of consideration of life-cycle costs and sustainment planning for "prototypes" obtained via OT agreements; and there is no sign that DoD, other agencies, or the Congress is ready to address this significant shortcoming.
Our favorite appendix contains the Common OT Myths and Facts. (It should come as no surprise that the guide refutes all of the following "myths" as "false," and follows with brief explanations:
1. There is only one type of OT available to DoD.
2. The OT authorities are new and are rarely used.
3. Since an OT is termed an "agreement," it is not a contract.
4. Since CICA does not apply, competition and fairness are not considered.
5. OTs Cannot be Protested.
6. None of the federal statutes or regulations apply to OTs.
7. OTs can only be awarded through a consortium.
8. The OT authorities can only use RDT&E appropriations.
9. Anyone in DoD can award an OT.
10. OTs will always be faster to award than other contractual instruments.
See also, DOD A&S Undersecretary Issues 'Other Transactions' Guidance, 60 GC ¶ 365; Richard L. Dunn, Feature Comment: DOD Other Transactions Guide-A Breath Of Fresh Air, 60 GC ¶ 362 ("The new Guide makes it clear that it is truly a guide in several ways. Its lay-out and style are a complete departure from the prior Guide and cannot be mistaken for a regulation. It contains highlighted case studies, a glossary of definitions, and a collection of common misunderstandings and myths…."). We also applaud DoD's guid-ance that requires that "Other transactions" agreements (OTAs) for prototypes must be reported in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS Gen. Dec. B-416061, 2018 CPD ¶ 180, finding that a follow-on production OTA was improper because (1) the initial prototype OT did not include a provision for a follow-on OT, and (2) the underlying prototype OT was not completed; Dunn asserts that GAO's 'business as usual' approach to OT's "is clearly wrong and harmful" to the overall reform effort. It is instructive to note, however, that DoD raised no public objection to GAO' precedent-setting decision.); Vernon J. H. The State of the industrial Base. We've previously bemoanedthroughout much of the prior administration's Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative, with its apparent prioritization of reducing contractor profits and overhead expenses, including independent research and development -the lack of attention paid to DoD's industrial base. Industrial base issues are surely to be invigorated by the 140-page report of the interagency task force established pursuant to Executive Order 13806 (82 Fed. Reg. 34597 (July 26, 2017)).
We also continue to be frustrated that neither the Executive Order nor the report addresses the business base that provides half of all contract support for national security, via contracts for services and solutions rather than products. The vulnerabilities in logistics, sustainment, and support services are likely to be at least as widespread as those in the component supply chain, but the lack of attention to those vulnerabilities means too little is known about them and, accordingly, too little is being done to address them. To date, neither DoD nor the White House has publicly acknowledged these problems. Notwithstanding that shortcoming, the study sets a valued benchmark and provides for needed actions. Three of the major findings animate much of what follows, and none are surprising:
• A surprising level of foreign dependence on competitor nations exists;
• Workforce challenges face employers across all sectors; and • Many sectors continue to move critical capabilities offshore in pursuit of competitive pricing and access to foreign markets.
We found that the other major finding was potentially the most sophisticated and under-appreciated: the task force articulated that impacts and risks primarily affect "sub-tiers" of the supply chains, rather than the major (or top-tier, or name brand, or conventional) prime contractors. The report then identifies "five macro forces driving risk" into the industrial base:
1. sequestration and uncertainty of U.S. Government spending; 2. decline of U.S. manufacturing capabilities and capacity; 3. deleterious U.S. Government business and procurement practices; That's a daunting list. The report then turns to "ten risk archetypes" that threaten the manufacturing and industrial base: sole source, single source, fragile source, fragile market, capacity constrained supply market, foreign dependency, diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages, gaps in U.S.-based human capital, erosion of U.S.-based infrastructure, and product security. For better or worse, the report includes a dizzying array of recommendations -large and small -at four levels: investment, policy, regulation, and legislation. Looking at the list -with recommendations ranging from the practical (reducing the personnel security clearance backlog through more efficient processes) to the aspirational (accelerating workforce development efforts to grow domestic science, technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM), and critical trade skills) -offers a stark insight into the long-term challenges faced in maintaining, let alone enhancing, the industrial base. We also expect readers will be particularly interested in the "sector summaries," subdivided into traditional defense sectors (think aircraft, munitions, shipbuilding, nuclear, space, and "soldier systems") and "cross-cutting" sectors (such as machine tooling, materials -both raw and downstream, electronics, software, and, of course, cybersecurity /pr-18-2417 .pdf ("DoD must make better use of its existing resources to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from network and supply chain threats…. While DoD cannot control all the actions of its numerous information system and supply chain participants, it can lead by example and use its purchasing power and regulatory authority to move companies to work with DoD to enhance security through addressing threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences of its capabilities and adapt to dynamic, constantly changing threats.").
Bear in mind that the concept of "Deliver Uncompromised," described not only in the above report but also in DoD testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last June, addresses the problem with emphasizing security in evaluation criteria for contracts, whether for supply chain or services. That problem is the absence of any agreed-upon way of measuring such security. We know how to measure cost, schedule, and (to a less welldefined degree) performance, but no one can say with confidence how to measure security. Until we do, this will remain a tough nut to crack and a hard problem to define, much less solve.
NOTES © 2019 Thomson Reuters
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i. Modern Tools: Ambrosia? Catnip for Defense Acquisition Geeks? Touted as a "new digital tool suite for acquisition policy," the Digital Acquisition Prototypes, developed by MITRE for USD(A&S) are, if nothing else, eyecatching, informative, and user-friendly. We encourage readers to visit the site and engage with these interactive tools. To the extent that all defense acquisition programs require two fundamental elements to execute: an acquisition pathway and a contracting strategy, the tools are intended to, among other things assist organizations in selecting the pathway and strategy that best meet their program's needs in a way that complements and supports positive program outcomes. The specific tools are an "adaptive acquisition framework" and a "contracting cone." DAU explains that, because there are many pathways for DoD to deliver capabilities, the Adaptive Acquisition Framework tool, see https://aaf.dau.mil/aaf/, helps you select the right pathway and provides detailed guidance for each. The pathways to choose from are: The contracting cone (c'mon, it's fun to say -try it!) also includes a handy (if high level and conclusory) Contract Type Matrix, which maps the contract types that are allowed for each of the major strategies outlined in the contracting cone.
J. Major System Performance Assessment: We were disappointed that DoD does not appear to have continued publication of the annual assessments of the Defense Acquisition System, which were produced during then-USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall's leadership. This year, however, thanks to GAO, we enjoyed a similarly data-rich gold mine of insights into DoD's major system acquisition performance. • GAO's broadest find appears to be that programs that implemented acquisition strategies to promote competition, including competitive award of contracts, reported decreases in total acquisition cost estimates as compared to others.
• DOD's 2017 portfolio grew both in number of programs (to 86) and cost (more than $1.66 trillion -we willingly concede that that's a lot of money).
• Programs in DOD's 2017 portfolio experienced a slight gain in buying power-meaning DOD is able to buy more goods or services for the same level of funding.
• Although the 2017 portfolio experienced more than $535 billion in cost growth over the original estimates, most of that growth ($464 billion or 86 percent) occurred prior to 2012.
• The 25 programs (representing 29 percent of the current portfolio) initiated since 2010 currently demonstrate better cost performance than older programs. GAO concluded that the acquisition reforms implemented that year (and later) were a driving factor behind the cost changes.
• On a less positive note, most programs did not fully demonstrate system design stability prior to conducting Critical Design Reviews; none of the programs fully demonstrated manufacturing processes that were in statistical control prior to starting production; and, for more than a third of the current programs GAO reviewed, DoD declared, or intend to declare, initial operational capability on the basis of limited (or no) initial operational test and evaluation.
In a somewhat related, but arguably broader, study, GAO offered a retrospective on some of the more recent acquisition reforms. See 
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to Address Key Issues, but Challenges Endure (September 2018), available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/694457.pdf. Among other things, GAO noted that:
• Despite questions about the capacity of federal agencies to oversee contractors, agencies continue to award contracts warranting increased management attention at a steady rate.
• The federal acquisition workforce faces workload and training challenges, including workforce gaps at DOD and across agencies.
• Unrealistic requirements continue to contribute to poor DoD program outcomes; yet, from 2008 to 2017, the Army's requirements development workforce decreased by 22 percent.
• The government's primary repository for acquisition data contained some unreliable data, and the system has demonstrated limitations. (More on this, below.)
• Agencies periodically use bridge contracts that, over time, delay opportunities for competition and can place the government at risk of paying higher prices for multiple years.
K. And Don't Forget infrastructure.
Stepping back from our defense focus, one of our initial hopes for this administration was a renewal of infrastructure investment, possibly with a greater reliance on public-private partnerships (PPP'S or P3). Remember when there was talk of a massive infrastructure infusion -specifically, a campaign promise to invest $550B to upgrade the nation's roads, highways, bridges tunnels, railways, airports, transit systems and ports, and maybe even the electrical grid and public wireless capacity? Obviously, that failed to materialize. Indeed, there has been little or no discussion about the ever-increasing, and cumulatively cascading, need to invest in infrastructure (other than the relentless concerns regarding cyber-security, of course). For a fleeting moment, the bridge disaster in Genoa, Italy, brought the issue back into the public's consciousness (but, again, in the current chaotic news cycle, it had no staying power Projects, 60 GC ¶ 193, DODIG-2018 -125, The Fort Bliss Hospital Replacement Military Construction Project, available at media. defense.gov/2018 /Jun/08/2001928750/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018 .PDF.
Vi. iT'S ALL ABoUT PeoPLe: HUMAn CAPiTAL AnD THe ACQUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe:
We continue to believe that the acquisition workforce is critically important, and we found plenty of interesting insights in this year's data-rich Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) The highest-rated competencies were:
• Among FAC-C (Contracting) holders: issuing changes, awarding contracts, and competition;
• Among FAC-COR (Contracting Officer's Representative) holders: inspection and acceptance and business acumen and communication.
• Among FAC-P/PM (Program and Project Managers) holders: leadership.
The lowest proficiency ratings were:
• For FAC-C holders: negotiating forward pricing rates agreements, as well as contracting in contingency or combat settings.
• For FAC-COR holders: pre-award communication and contract negotiation.
• For FAC-P/PM holders: systems engineering.
The data represents a robust, but nonetheless, surprisingly limited, sampling of the workforce. A total of 36,836 responses (a significantly larger response rate than the FY16 survey) included 25,562 complete survey responses. As for coverage:
• The agencies with the largest number of FAC responses -all with less than 27 percent reporting -were the Department of Veterans Affairs (2,568), the Department of Homeland Security (2,325), and the Department of Health and Human Services (1,912).
Moreover, if there's a fundamental flaw in the data, it's that respondents self-rated their own level of proficiency. (But, hey, it is what it is: a survey.) More troubling was the observation that a plurality of FAC holders dedicates 0-25% of their time to acquisition-related activities. (Frankly, we're not terribly interested in knowing the competence level of the folks who aren't doing the work. Although, hypothetically, it's nice to know that there is depth on the bench, in case we need to call on it at some point.) The demographic information was also interesting:
• The most common paygrade, the GS-13 level, represents 28.7% of FAC holders, yet the most common category of years of acquisition experience was only 6-10 years. (Does this mean that the more senior acquisition professionals were too busy, or too jaded, to complete the survey?)
• The most common age category among FAC holders was 51-55 years, with millennials accounting for 11.3% of the acquisition workforce. (Again, given the response rate, we're hesitant to conclude that we're working with a representative sample of the actual workforce.)
In addition, earlier in the year, GAO concluded that DoD could do more to optimize the program management career field and community.
The military services recognize that they need skilled program managers to develop acquisition programs and have taken steps to develop that top-notch talent. ... Yet, [despite a solid training regimen, establishment of professional standards, and sharing of lessons learned] when compared to leading practices, we found that several practices used by the military services for training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting people for program manager positions could be improved….
In nearly all cases, the military services could improve their practices by learning from ideas and initiatives being used by another military service or by commercial companies and ensuring that civilian and military personnel have similar opportunities to develop. improve its retention and selection practices; the Army could improve training, mentoring, and retention; and the Navy, which merited special attention, has "practices that do not extensively align with leading practices in each of the areas of training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting program managers").
Vii. PRoCUReMenT DATA: BeTTeR GRAPHiCS, SAMe DATA?
A. Data Crunching the Federal Procurement Spend. In a break from (longstanding) tradition, the Chapter does not offer a detailed report of last fiscal year's procurement and grant spending. We expect that, as more fulsome data becomes available, FY2018 will reflect mixed results, initially slowed by continuing resolutions (CR's) and uncertainty, with a frantic rush at the end of the fiscal year (FY), but, overall, less spending than in FY2017. FY2019, of course, is off to an uneven start with many agencies fully funded, while others are bogged down by appropriations paralysis. One of the most entertaining graphics reflects the distribution of contracts awarded over the course of the fiscal year.
B. Test
• While no one should be surprised that the last two weeks of September are the highest (and represent significant outliers on the chart), the chart also indicates that "spending tended to rise and fall on a monthly cadence, with roughly one small peak and one small drop per month." Frankly, we have no idea what to make of this. And, while we're not surprised that the last week of December and the first week of January represent the two least active weeks of the year, we can't explain why the first week of April is the most active week outside the month of September.
• Moreover, "the end-of-year spikes consistently occurred across the decade, and … [o]n average [,] September spikes accounted for between 6-8 percent of the annual spending in a fiscal year."
• At the same time, we thought it made perfect sense that "[m]odifications … displayed less variance and did not spike as drastically at the end of each fiscal year. This suggests that new contracts-not modifications-drove the spikes at the end of each fiscal year."
• The data suggests that "Facilities, Equipment, and Construction 
